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The transformation of trust in China’s alternative food networks: disruption,
reconstruction, and development
Raymond Yu Wang 1, Zhenzhong Si 2, Cho Nam Ng 3 and Steffanie Scott 2
ABSTRACT. Food safety issues in China have received much scholarly attention, yet few studies systematically examined this matter
through the lens of trust. More importantly, little is known about the transformation of different types of trust in the dynamic process
of food production, provision, and consumption. We consider trust as an evolving interdependent relationship between different actors.
We used the Beijing County Fair, a prominent ecological farmers’ market in China, as an example to examine the transformation of
trust in China’s alternative food networks. We argue that although there has been a disruption of institutional trust among the general
public since 2008 when the melamine-tainted milk scandal broke out, reconstruction of individual trust and development of
organizational trust have been observed, along with the emergence and increasing popularity of alternative food networks. Based on
more than six months of fieldwork on the emerging ecological agriculture sector in 13 provinces across China as well as monitoring of
online discussions and posts, we analyze how various social factors—including but not limited to direct and indirect reciprocity,
information, endogenous institutions, and altruism—have simultaneously contributed to the transformation of trust in China’s
alternative food networks. The findings not only complement current social theories of trust, but also highlight an important yet
understudied phenomenon whereby informal social mechanisms have been partially substituting for formal institutions and gradually
have been building trust against the backdrop of the food safety crisis in China.
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INTRODUCTION
Food safety issues in China have received much scholarly
attention (Wang et al. 2008, Klein 2009, 2013, Veeck et al. 2010,
Yan 2012, Yang 2013), yet few studies systematically examined
this matter through the lens of trust. In particular, little is known
about the transformation of different types of trust in the dynamic
process of food production, provision, and consumption. In
previous social sciences literature, trust has been commonly
viewed as a perception of individuals, organizations, or
institutions. Research on trust tends to explore social-
psychological features that might contribute to the establishment
of trust. For instance, some scholars focus on sources and
interpretations of interpersonal and interorganizational trust
(Lorenz 1988, Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995, Nooteboom et al.
1997, Lane and Bachmann 1998, Uslaner 2002, Rothstein 2005);
others explore individuals’ perceptions of authorities and seek to
understand origins and the process of establishment of
institutional trust (Levi and Stoker 2000, Mishler and Rose 2001,
Bachmann and Inkpen 2011). In the field of food studies,
consumers’ trust in food has been on the research agenda in
Europe over the past two decades, with a focus on variations in
and explanations of trust in different cultural and institutional
contexts (Berg 2004, Kjærnes 2006, Fritz and Fischer 2007, Lobb
et al. 2007). However, trust is rarely interrogated as a
multidimensional behavior from an evolutionary perspective. In
other words, little academic attention is paid to the
transformation of different types of trust in a dynamic process
(Chen 2013). To a great extent, this research gap constrains
scholars’ knowledge about how trust evolves in complex
socioeconomic contexts and how the transformation of trust
might influence long-term social interactions among a variety of
actors. To respond to this research gap, this paper uses trust in
food as a lens to illustrate processes of, and conditions for, the
transformation of trust in China’s emerging alternative food
networks (AFNs).[1] By viewing trust as a dynamic, multifaceted
concept, it seeks to draw social scientists’ attention to a significant
and yet poorly understood phenomenon in which a series of
informal institutions have been partially substituting for formal
institutions, building trust and gradually reshaping the dynamics
of interactions between food producers and consumers against
the backdrop of food safety crisis in China.  
A food system usually refers to the process of food production,
processing, transportation, consumption, and waste disposal
(Ericksen 2008). In the era of rapid modernization, an implicit
trust is placed in a set of formal institutions that ensure the quality
of food when urban residents purchase food from conventional
retail outlets such as wet markets, convenience stores, and
supermarkets. The conventional food systems in the West have
led to not only efficiency and economic benefits but also various
crises (Sonnino and Marsden 2006). Critical reflections by rural
sociologists and human ecologists unveiled their social and
geographical disembeddedness, their destruction of the
relationship between people and food, and their social and
environmental consequences (Feagan 2007, Milestad et al. 2010).
In response to the crises, a group of AFNs emerged in the West
in the 1990s or earlier (Goodman et al. 2012). Common examples
of AFNs are farmers’ markets, Community-Supported
Agriculture (CSA),[2] buying clubs, community gardens, and
public procurement programs (Si et al. 2014). Fostering the
reconnection between people and food and the re-embedding of
food within social and geographical relations, these AFNs
demonstrate a significantly different logic in challenging the
conventional food systems that are highly industrialized and
globalized.  
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In China, the rethinking and criticism of conventional food
systems accompanied by the emergence of AFNs (Shi et al. 2011a,
Scott et al. 2014, Si et al. 2014) were triggered largely by food
safety scandals in the past few years, symbolized by the melamine
formula scandal in 2008. Agrifood scholars have argued that
consumers purchasing food at these alternative venues are
reconnecting and building a new trust relationship with individual
vendors and food production groups (Jarosz 2000, Whatmore et
al. 2003, Kirwan 2004, Holloway et al. 2006, Wiskerke 2009,
Freyer et al. 2014). The shift of some Chinese consumers from
conventional food retail venues to AFNs thus not only serves as
a lens through which food safety issues can be observed, but also
offers a unique case to examine the transformation of trust in the
specific social and institutional settings of China.  
We took the most prominent ecological farmers’ market in China,
the Beijing Country Fair (BCF), as a case to interrogate the
evolution in consumers’ patronage of different food venues, with
a particular focus on informal institutions and social relations
that have been facilitating the transformation of trust and the
emergence and prosperity of AFNs.
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TRUST
The conceptualization of trust has been a contentious topic. Some
posit that trust is composed of background expectations that are
part of a “world known in common” (Schuetz 1945) and
constitutive expectations that are portrayed by formal and
informal rules specifying alternative actions regardless of one’s
individual desires (Garfinkel 1963, Zucker 1986, Putnam 1995,
Lane and Bachmann 1998, Rousseau et al. 1998); others
emphasize that trust is associated with one’s willingness to take a
risk and be vulnerable to another. In essence, it is risky to place
trust in another actor because the trustor would suffer a loss if
his or her expectations for cooperation were not fulfilled
(Johnson-George and Swap 1982, Mayer et al. 1995, Schoorman
et al. 2007). However, in terms of broad theoretical and empirical
research, it is important to delineate boundaries between trust as
an aspect of social relationships and trust as a consequence of
social norms and regulations. More specifically, it should be
clearly recognized that trust itself  is a choice of action or a state
of perception. We argue that trust, in fact, can be derived from
various social, economic, and political factors that are difficult
to thoroughly include in one definition. Therefore, the definition
of trust should rest on features that characterize a unique
interdependent relationship rather than on its sources and
foundations.  
In a general socioeconomic context, we adopted Coleman’s (1990)
definition of trust, which includes four defining characteristics.
First, trust involves a minimum of two parties, among whom one
party, i.e., the trustor, can choose whether or not to voluntarily
place trust on the other party, i.e., the trustee. The trust here placed
on the trustee could be in various forms including, but not limited
to, money, time, effort, support, affection, and so forth. Second,
after trust is placed, the trustee can choose to honor or abuse the
trust. Either way, the trustor has no control over the action of the
trustee. Third, there is a time lag during which the trustor has
delivered his or her trust and yet is not aware of the behavior of
the trustee. Last, the trustor is better off  to place trust than not
to do so if  the trustee is trustworthy; however, the trustor is worse
off should the trustee be untrustworthy, assuming both parties
are purposive actors. This behavioral description of trust not only
contains critical components of the above mentioned definitions,
i.e. willingness to accept vulnerability and expectations of positive
behavior from another, but also leaves space for further
investigations of factors that might affect the behavior of the
actors involved.  
In addition to its diverse definitions, the classification of trust is
another controversial topic. Once again, many researchers
highlight the sources of trust and classify it as process based,
characteristic based, competence based, or institutionally based
(Zucker 1986, Lindgreen 2003, Edelenbos and Eshuis 2012).
However, these classifications still face the conundrum that
pertains to distinguishing sources of trust before carrying out any
substantial analysis. In the field of food studies, some scholars
argue that trust is a concept at the individual or interpersonal
level (Berg 2004). Others focus on trust in institutions (Chen 2008,
de Jonge et al. 2008). Freyer et al. (2014) identified three types of
consumer trust in organic products: uninformed organic
consumers, informed organic consumers, and informed and
engaged consumers. This classification establishes linkages
between trust and consumers’ motivation, habits, and
perceptions; however, it is inadequate for understanding the
transformation of different types of trust in a broader context
where trust relationships are more complex and trust is placed in
divergent trustees. Based on the identity of trustees and previous
work by Edelenbos and Eshuis (2012) and Freyer et al. (2014), we
propose a categorization of trust as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. An object-oriented classification of trust.
 
Type of Trust Descriptions
Individual trust The trust that a trustor places in an individual. The
key feature that sustains individual trust is an
interpersonal relationship that is usually based on
face-to-face contacts and mutual acquaintance.
Organizational
trust
The trust that a trustor places in an organization,
which could be a group, an enterprise, or a
nonprofit association. This trust relationship is
attributable to the ability, benevolence, and
integrity of an organization.
Institutional
trust
The trust that a trustor places in formal rules and
institutional arrangements. The key feature that
sustains institutional trust is a relationship
involving multilevel interactions. This implies that
one actor trusts institutions (i.e., contracts,
regulations, social conventions) rather than another
individual or organization. Institutional trust is
usually based on confidence in an institutional
actor’s (e.g., regulatory agencies, governments,
authorities) intention, capability, fairness,
consistency, and efficiency of enforcing established
rules.
We do not intend to engage in the grand conceptual discussion
of trust classification, but rather to emphasize that trust can be
placed in different objects at different levels; therefore, it could
better serve the following analysis on the issue of trust
transformation in China’s AFNs. The main reason to adopt this
object-oriented classification of trust is that individual and
collective behaviors (i.e., whom one chooses to collaborate with
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and at which venue one chooses to carry out his or her
socioeconomic exchanges) are easier to observe in complex
settings. Supported by observable phenomena and empirical data,
the conceptual framework in this paper is more compatible with
a heuristic way of investigating conditions for the transformation
of trust.
RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION
We drew from a larger research project conducted between 2010
and 2014 on China’s emerging ecological agriculture sector. This
project examined the typology, organizational structures,
governance, and socioeconomic embeddedness of the ecological
agriculture sector, including certified and uncertified organic and
“green food”[3] and various types of AFNs. The research team
collectively conducted 127 in-depth interviews over 6 months of
fieldwork in Liaoning, Beijing, Shandong, Henan, Anhui,
Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guangxi,
Fujian, and Hainan. Informants were identified through various
contacts including academic organizations, nongovernmental
organizations, CSA networks, and government referrals. They
were key players in the ecological agriculture sector with diverse
backgrounds: entrepreneurs who run organic and green food
farms, initiators of AFNs, representatives of organic certification
agencies, government officials, consumer associations, nongovernmental
organizations, and researchers (see Table 2).
Table 2. Number of interviews conducted with different types of
interviewees.
 
Type of interviewee Number of interviews†
Managers and workers on ecological farms 42
Managers of farmers’ markets 4
Representatives of buying clubs 3
People renting plots for recreational
gardening
5
Governmental officials 20
Researchers 32
Organic certification agencies 11
Directors and employees of NGOs 10
Total 127
†Some interviews were conducted with the same interviewee.
Although the primary focus of our research was the case of the
BCF, we drew upon information from a much wider array of
sources across China, which include 3 in-depth semistructured
interviews with BCF market managers, on-site observations from
3 visits to BCF markets, 12 in-depth interviews with vendors of
the BCF and Shanghai Nonghao farmers’ market, and interviews
with organizers of 3 consumer organizations. These interviews
were conducted in April and December 2012 and March 2013.
Interviews with market managers covered questions about the
establishment and operation of the farmers’ market, general
features and motivations of their customers, their perceptions of
food safety and trust issues, approaches to build the solidarity
among their vendors and to maintain their customer bases, and
the wider implications of farmers’ markets for China’s food
system. Interviews with market vendors, mainly CSA farmers,
focused on the operation of CSAs, their ecological farming
practices, policy impacts on their operations, and various
strategies they used to maintain trust relationships with other
vendors and with their customers. Interviews with consumer
organizations, i.e., buying clubs, covered the establishment of the
organization, consumers’ food safety concerns, consumers’
perceptions of trustworthiness of food sources, why they
purchased food from certain sources, their descriptions of
personal connections with food producers, and so forth.
Therefore, findings presented in this paper are not confined to
observations and interviews at the BCF. To enhance our
understanding of consumer perspectives, reports from public
media and newsletters of CSA farms and the BCF were also
reviewed. Additional information was acquired by monitoring
online discussions and posts mainly from the BCF’s official
account on Weibo, the most popular microblog in China.
THE DISRUPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST:
UNDERSTANDING THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN CUSTOMERS AND INSTITUTIONS
The analysis begins with a discussion about the disruption of
institutional trust. Food used to be an innocent sphere of Chinese
urban consumers’ daily lives. Although food safety incidents
emerged much earlier and recurred consistently over the past few
decades in China, this situation has changed dramatically with
the steady increase of food safety scandals in the past decade.
Most prominently, in 2008, the Sanlu group, a leading giant in
the Chinese dairy business, was found intentionally
manufacturing melamine-tainted baby formula, which resulted
in 6 deaths and nearly 300,000 cases of children suffering from
kidney problems (Yang 2013). The melamine-tainted milk powder
scandal, preceded and followed by a series of other food safety
incidents,[4] constituted large-scale production and circulation of
hazardous foods. These cases revealed serious problems in
conventional food supply chains and therefore caused a
widespread disruption of trust in conventional food retail venues
and regulatory institutions (Yan 2012).  
To understand food safety issues in China, several previous studies
have adopted Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens’ depiction of
“risk society” (Giddens 1991, Beck 1992). The notion of risk
society is characterized by social anxiety resulted from
incalculable, unpredictable, and uncontrollable impacts of
scientific and technological advancement in postindustrialized
countries. In light of the theory of risk society, these studies
analyzed Chinese consumers’ behavior and attitudes toward food
safety issues and further incorporated local characteristics into
the theory that was built in the context of western societies (Veeck
et al. 2010, Yan 2012, Klein 2013). However, the risk society
framework is inadequate for understanding consumers’ response
to rules and regulations that are supposed to minimize risks of
modernity and ensure food safety (Kjærnes 2010). In China, a
series of food quality certification standards, including “hazard-
free food,” green food, and organic food, have been established
to cope with the increase of food safety scandals (see Scott et al.
2014). In the 1990s and 2000s, a set of food safety laws and
regulations was enacted. By 2013, there were about 2000 national
food regulations, including the Food Safety Law enacted in 2009,
and 2900 industry-based regulations (Agres 2013). A new
administrative system was established at the national level to
define, coordinate, and supervise the responsibilities and actions
of each governmental agency in food safety governance (Jia and
Jukes 2013). Food safety offenders faced much more severe
punishment. However, food safety problems persist. Based on our
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interviews with consumers and vendors, and data collected from
Weibo, a significant decline in the level of institutional trust was
observed. This disruption of institutional trust is mainly reflected
by two aspects of consumers’ and food producers’ activities.  
One is that the general public, particularly the so-called “middle
class,”[5] has shown a propensity to purchase food from AFNs
rather than from conventional food venues. The most salient
phenomenon is that products labeled as green food or organic
food fail to convince a large number of customers that they truly
meet the “green” or “organic” standards. The majority of our
interviewees expressed their concerns over what these labels might
imply about the production of the food. For instance, during a
27 May 2012 interview, a woman at the Shanghai Nonghao 
Farmers’ Market explained, “All the certified organic food is
fraudulent. As long as [farms] give [certification agencies] money,
you can get certified.” A member of a buying club in Beijing
commented in a 9 April 2012 interview, “The adulteration of
organic certification is very common. It’s so hard to tell whether
it is truly organic or not so I simply don’t trust them … I heard
that sometimes before inspection, certification agencies will call
the farm, ask them to prepare for the inspection (take away all
the chemical stuff).” Moreover, consumers’ distrust of certified
organic food is widely reflected in mass media reports (Shao and
Yang 2014). Some even claim that it is the internal competition
among regulatory agencies and uncoordinated institutional
responsibilities in a fragmented authoritarian regime that
prevented food administration agencies from successfully
fulfilling their responsibilities (Chen 2009, Pei et al. 2011, Yan
2012). These comments indicate that the interviewees were
skeptical about the credibility of the food certification system,
and also point to the crisis of governance. They questioned the
accountability of the Chinese authorities that initiated, promoted,
and supervised the food certification system (Klein 2009).  
The other aspect of the disruption of institutional trust is reflected
by the fact that market vendors, most of whom run CSA farms,
are not motivated to have their products certified by formal
institutions either, because, they argued, the certification of food
would increase their costs. Moreover, they were not convinced
that the certification was a necessary assurance of the quality of
their food or could attract more customers. When explaining
during a 6 April 2012 interview why he did not pursue organic
certification, a green food farm operator in Dalian, Liaoning
province, noted that because of the challenge of finding organic
seeds, organic farms claiming to be organic may not really be so.
Another CSA farmer in Beijing commented during a 1 April 2012
interview that there were so many fake organic foods in the market
that the government had to “clean up ‘organic.’” A Beijing CSA
farmer and vendor at the BCF claimed during a 31 March 2012
interview that “third party certification is not as ethical as a direct
trust relationship with customers.” This perception was echoed
by a vendor at the BCF:  
 I do not trust those capital intensive large-scale organic
farms. In China, organic farms established with the
involvement of big capital and [government] authorities
are generally fake. They kidnapped the market channels,
the propaganda and other information resources to
promote their so-called "organic" food. But consumers
have lost confidence in them. 
(Interview, 9 March 2013, Beijing)  
Reasons for the decline of institutional trust are complex.
Previous studies suggested that some loopholes in the formal
institutions made the system fail to provide safe food that
consumers trust (Mol 2014). These loopholes include
contradictory and overlapping regulations and laws, failure of
coordination among governmental agencies, a lack of
information-sharing mechanisms, inadequate participation of
independent third parties, and so forth (for details see Broughton
and Walker 2010, Liu 2010, Wang and Hu 2011, Jia and Jukes
2013, FORHEAD 2014).  
Based on our fieldwork, the explosion of information is another
major cause for the disruption of institutional trust. With growing
media coverage of food safety issues and the development of
technology that provides the general public with more access to
information, most consumers build their perception of food
safety problems through media rather than direct personal
experiences (Yang 2013). Potential pathogenicity of abused food
additives, coupled with unsanitary environments for food
processing, top the headlines of Chinese news reports (Yan 2012).
This leads to an exponential increase of the number of people
who are exposed to food safety risks. “What can we eat?” became
one of the most commonly raised questions by Chinese netizens.
On 15 September 2014, we found 2,307,200 posts by searching
“what can we eat” on the most popular social media in China, the
microblog Weibo.  
Although full transparency is curtailed by the party-state
authority, Yang (2013) identified two diverging movements:
namely, hegemonic practices by government and corporations to
suppress free dissemination of information and counter-
hegemonic practices by diffused contention on Weibo to express
dissent. The ramifications of this contestation are far beyond facts
related to food safety problems. The information disclosed during
this contestation changes the social perceptions of food safety. It
has not only drawn extensive public attention, but also revealed
a hidden side of food production and regulation associated with
Chinese historical memories of food insecurity and authoritarian
control, thus making a far-reaching impact on the decline of social
and institutional trust (Veeck et al. 2010, Yan 2012).
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL TRUST:
UNDERSTANDING THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN VENDORS AND CUSTOMERS
Although the level of institutional trust has radically declined,
food is still an indispensable part of people’s daily life. It is
important to understand how Chinese urban residents react to
such a situation of insecurity. We argue that the pattern of food
consumption among some Chinese urban residents who
participate in AFNs is gradually changing. Although the
trustworthiness of conventional food networks is impaired, in the
past few years an increasing number of people have been
motivated to purchase food through AFNs. Moreover, the
establishment of these AFNs has demonstrated a reconstruction
of individual trust between producers and consumers.  
One should note that individual trust is not a novel concept in
food transactions. It exists at wet markets, where consumers and
producers have face-to-face exchanges. Since the 1990s, the food
supply chain in China has changed substantially. With the
modernization of food value chains, urbanites have becoming
increasingly disconnected from the production of food. Trust
between individuals tends to be replaced by formal institutions,
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e.g., food quality certifications, that corporatize and standardize
food production. However, after the food safety scandals broke
out, individual trust in food has rebounded in a small number of
ecological farmers’ markets and other AFNs in China in response
to the food safety crisis.  
Farmers’ markets as a type of AFN demonstrate new
characteristics compared with traditional wet markets. More than
a simple place of transaction, farmers’ markets nowadays
emphasize “healthy” and “ecological” food production processes
and other social values (Si et al. 2014). Vendors at these markets
are committed to ensuring the safety and quality of food.
However, to convince the consumers, much effort is required to
reconstruct individual trust because consumers are skeptical
about whether the food is indeed safe and healthy when they are
incapable of judging the quality from its appearance. In the BCF,
we observed a variety of reciprocal activities. These activities
suggested that, as difficult as it might be, trust problems can be
overcome through certain social mechanisms.
Direct reciprocity
Direct reciprocity is based on the concept of repeated interactions
(Axelrod 1984, Diekmann 2004). The chance of another
encounter between the same two individuals constitutes a
“shadow of the future,” which creates incentives for cooperation
between the individuals. Thus cooperative strategies might prevail
as long as the probability of future interactions is sufficiently
high.  
In empirical settings, one way to enhance direct reciprocity is to
build stronger connections between vendors and customers
through direct face-to-face contact to the extent that the
customers have confidence in the vendors’ commitment to a long-
term business relationship. For example, a vendor from
Heilongjiang province in northeast China whom we met at the
Beijing Country Fair on 9 March 2013 provided many photos of
his rice farms to demonstrate to customers that he adhered to
sustainable cultivation practices. He sought to convince
customers that his rice was indeed produced in a natural and
relatively clean environment and he was committed to a long-term
business. In addition, the solid educational background, the
strong communication skills, and the unadorned personality of
many CSA farmers at the BCF all have greatly contributed to the
establishment of individual trust between them and their
customers. Shi Yan, one of the founders of the Little Donkey
Farm and the founder of Shared Harvest Farm in Beijing, is also
a well-known food activist in China. She received her doctoral
degree in agricultural economics at Renmin University of China.
With her educational background, internship experience on an
organic farm in the United States (Shi 2012), and visits to organic-
related institutions and organizations in the West, she became a
poster child for publicizing the CSA model. With extensive media
exposure, many customers can easily identify with and relate to
her. Shi Yan stated in interviews on 11 April 2012 and 6 December
2012 that through various forms of direct communication,
vendors have become reliable partners who would not jeopardize
their reciprocal relationship for short-term benefits.  
Another way to improve direct reciprocity is to give more control
to the customers in the vendor-customer interactions. For
instance, many vendors at the BCF allow customers to visit their
farms without an appointment. Many farms also lease plots to
customers who want to grow their own food and provide
trustworthy inputs such as uncoated and non–genetically
modified seeds and organic fertilizer, and technical supports (Si
et al. 2014). This type of control can be viewed as an assurance
provided by the vendors that allows the consumers to observe,
experience, and monitor daily operation and farming practices of
the vendors. As a result, doubts of the customers can be
alleviated.  
As the market in Beijing became more popular, the 3000
customers[6] or more who flock to the small market venues two or
three times a week made it too overcrowded for easy face-to-face
communication. The original desire of the market founders to
make the market a place for direct producer-consumer
communication became less feasible. To compensate for the loss
of direct interaction opportunities, other means were needed to
bring customers and vendors together.
Indirect reciprocity and information
Despite the effectiveness of building trust via direct
communications with customers, from an evolutionary
perspective trust via direct reciprocity is not fully stable because
it is constantly challenged by defections and random “noises” (see
Fehr and Gintis 2007). Indirect reciprocity, alternatively, is
another powerful mechanism to develop individual trust. The
term “indirect” implies that it is beyond one’s own experiences
and one can use experiences obtained from a third party. Thus,
the key aspects of indirect reciprocity are information and
reputation (Mailath and Samuelson 2006, Nowak 2006, 2012,
Sigmund 2012, Ng et al. 2013). Customers can associate their
choices of food with past experiences of others who are within
the scope of their social networks. In other words, indirect
reciprocity provides an opportunity for customers to adjust their
behavior based on information they receive. Importantly, indirect
reciprocity allows the emergence and dissemination of both
positive and negative information. Therefore, not only did
consumers have incentives to share information with each other
to avoid untrustworthy vendors, trustworthy vendors were also
motivated to enhance indirect reciprocity to attract more
customers and to build their loyal customer-bases.  
Information about the BCF was initially passed from one
customer to another. This simple yet effective way of
communicating, usually referred to as word of mouth, brought
the first wave of customers to the BCF (interview with the founder
of the BCF, 3 April 2012, Beijing). As a customer noted, compared
with organic food certification labels, he would rather trust the
assessment of his close friends (see a short note from People’s
Daily 2012). The effects of indirect reciprocity have been further
enhanced since the BCF opened an account on the most widely
used microblog in China, Weibo, in 2011. Through the new form
of media, word of mouth can be mediated through electronic
means. This technogical development allows both vendors and
customers to share information through their social networks via
the internet, and it results in a significant increase in network
density and information transparency. As one of the founders of
the BCF noted, the BCF indeed took off  in 2011 when they opened
their Weibo account (interview with the founder of the BCF, 3
April 2012, Beijing). Thirty farm vendors had their Weibo
accounts listed on the front page of the BCF’s blog in 2014. About
20 of them participated in the market regularly in 2012, and all
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of them have their own Weibo accounts through which they
maintain a close connection with their customers. The BCF’s
Weibo account had more than 104,000 followers as of February
2015 and is still growing rapidly. The BCF frequently posts about
knowledge-sharing activities related to organic and ecological
agriculture, the hours and location of upcoming markets,
responses to questions from customers, recruitment of interns
and volunteers, and information about market vendors and
healthy food. By commenting on these posts, customers are
maintaining a close communication with the market and with
others.  
Traditional media, i.e., television and newspapers, have also
effectively facilitated the dissemination of information about the
BCF. Between 2011 and 2013, 43 reports have been published on
renowned media such as China Central Television, People’s Daily,
The Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times. For a compiled list
of media reports, see the blog of the BCF (in Chinese; http://blog.
sina.com.cn/s/articlelist_1918547924_2_1.html). These media all
have a huge number of viewers and readers. Their coverage of the
BCF inspired a broad discussion on food safety issues, organic
farming, and healthy lifestyles among the general public, creating
strong impacts on consumers’ trust in the BCF.  
Through indirect reciprocity, the outcomes of dyadic interactions
are amplified. The behavior of a vendor not only influences the
impression of a customer with whom he or she directly interacts,
but also generates a reputation. The reputation of a vendor could
travel through an electronic social network as well as a traditional
media network and affect how other people might perceive this
particular vendor, or even the entire farmers’ market. Under the
effects of both direct and indirect reciprocity, individual trust has
been widely reconstructed and observed in the BCF.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL TRUST:
UNDERSTANDING THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP IN
THE FARMERS’ MARKET AND COMMUNITY
SUPPORTED ARGRICULTURE
The BCF has undergone a period of rapid expansion in terms of
its overall scale and number of customers. During the past four
years, organizational trust placed by customers in the capacity,
benevolence, and integrity of the BCF and CSA farms, has
emerged, thrived, and further supported their expansion in
Beijing. Among the 40 vendors of the BCF in 2012, about 20 were
small-scale farms that operated in a CSA model. The development
of organizational trust is a particularly interesting and significant
outcome that has not been reported in previous food studies in
China.
Endogenous rules: participatory guarantee system
The development of the BCF is associated with a set of
endogenous institutional arrangements, with a key objective of
building customers’ trust in this newly emerged organization.
These endogenous rules are established to regulate the behavior
of vendors, maintain reputation of the BCF, and ensure interests
of customers.  
In the case of the BCF, these endogenous rules constitute a
participatory guarantee system (PGS), which refers to “locally
focused quality assurance systems … that certify producers based
on active participation of stakeholders and are built on a
foundation of trust, social networks and knowledge exchange”
(International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movement,
Participatory Guarantee Systems, http://www.ifoam.org/fr/value-
chain/participatory-guarantee-systems-pgs). The term PGS
embodies a variety of alternative organic certification approaches
that are different from third-party certification. However, it
generally involves participation of various stakeholders to inspect
farm members of a PGS system and ensure their compliance. Its
basic elements are shared vision, participation, transparency, trust,
learning, and horizontality, i.e., sharing of power (International
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movement 2006). The BCF has
been attempting to establish China’s very first PGS, which is an
approach for enhancing organizational trust. Their effort is
reflected in the following two endeavors.  
For one thing, market managers established a set of criteria for
selecting potential vendors who intend to join the market. These
criteria include pesticide-free and nonchemical cultivation
methods, the application of combined farming techniques such as
crop rotation and careful soil management, the participation of
vendors in regular meetings for updates on organic farming
experiences, and so forth. (For more details, see the blog [in Chinese]
of the Beijing Country Farm, http://blog.sina.com.cn/
u/1918547924.) These criteria demonstrate that quality control and
good reputation are the top concerns for market managers of the
BCF.  
For another thing, an inspection committee was established to
scrutinize activities of farms in the BCF. This inspection committee
consists of a variety of members so that every key category of
stakeholders (i.e., managers, vendors, customers, scholars, and
nongovernmental organizations) can express their concerns and
gain full access to information. Instead of being inspected by formal
institutions, i.e., third-party certification agencies, farms are
screened and monitored by the self-monitoring system conducted
by the inspection committee. This self-certification system is
represented by the Management Guidelines of the BCF drafted by
market managers and vendors. It can be viewed as a form of peer
pressure on all participants to maintain solidarity and trust in the
group.  
From a theoretical point of view, these above-mentioned
endogenous rules are imposed to guarantee the quality of food
produced by market vendors. As a trustee who needs to prevent
potential trustors from walking away, the market adopts a strategy
that increases its transparency and provides information to the
trustors through various social media such as Weibo and Wechat.[7] 
This can be interpreted as an investment to enhance the effects of
indirect reciprocity mechanisms. The PGS, as a comprehensive set
of informal institutional arrangements, creates a good reputation
for the market and enable this reputation to spread through social
networks, thereby successfully developing trustors’ confidence in
the BCF.
Altruism
In addition to endogenous rules, another unique social mechanism
that has facilitated organizational trust is a “selfless” concern for
the welfare of vendors, customers, and employees. This type of
concern is different from reciprocal behavior in the sense that no
immediate or long-term reward can be expected from this costly
input. Different patterns of selfless behavior were observed during
our fieldwork in Beijing. In particular, our interviewees, who were
managers of the BCF, repeatedly emphasized that they were a “big
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family” rather than a profit-driven company. As a grassroots
organization, the BCF identifies itself  as a social enterprise, a
term that embodies social goals such as capacity building of
grassroots organizations, supporting the livelihoods of
smallholders, and raising environmental awareness, along with
profit making. This altruistic facet also constitutes the shared
vision, a key element of PGS, among stakeholders of the market.
Based on these observations, we argue that altruism is an
important factor for collective cooperation and organizational
trust in the BCF.  
Human altruistic behaviors have received considerable academic
attention from various disciplines (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).
For instance, it is well known that kinship altruism widely exists
among humans (Hamilton 1963, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981,
Mohtashemi and Mui 2003). We present empirical evidence that
substantiates theories of cooperation and human altruism as well
as complements previous studies with regard to trust in food. One
might argue that the altruistic behaviors observed within the
farmers’ market and CSAs are fundamentally purposive actions
to attract more customers or to pursue economic benefits.
However, it is not our position to speculate on the intention of
the managers and vendors of the BCF without sufficient social-
psychological evaluations. What we can rely on is comments,
conversations, and information that we observed and collected in
our fieldwork. We are convinced by the following evidence that,
in addition to reciprocal behaviors, altruistic behaviors motivated
by similarity or nongenetic relatedness also exist in the BCF and
they have improved the level of organizational trust and facilitated
the development of the market.  
The altruistic behaviors of managers and vendors in the BCF is
first reflected in the self-identification of the BCF as a social
enterprise that aims at improving environmental and human well-
being. Although many CSA vendors at the BCF are formally
registered as business corporations because of legal constraints
in China, their message and the culture being conveyed to the
society have always put health, social justice, and environment
concerns ahead of profits. To achieve this objective, the BCF
actively organized public lectures in Beijing and Shanghai to
promote a healthier and more environmentally friendly way of
life. Some well-educated CSA farmers even used to be white-collar
workers. However, they quit their seemingly decent jobs in cities
to start CSA farms with a strong commitment to environmental
and social values (interviews with a CSA farmer in Beijing on 31
March 2012 and two ecological rice farmers in Beijing on 5 March
2013).  
Second, altruistic behaviors are demonstrated through the ways
that the BCF and CSAs are managed. For instance, no charge is
imposed on vendors for selling at the market. As one of the
managers of the BCF told us in an interview on 3 April 2012 in
Beijing, collecting entrance fees from vendors would open them
up to people thinking that they were self-interested and willing to
accept anyone as a vendor, thereby jeopardizing their reputation.
Market managers have used a number of additional sources of
revenue such as fund raising and selling hand-made food products
on the market; however, collecting admission fees from vendors
has never been an option. More altruistic behaviors are reflected
in family activities regularly organized by CSAs for their
customers. These activities not only encourage closer connections
to nature, but also strengthen customers’ family bonds. Blind
dates are even arranged by the market and CSAs for single interns
who work at CSA farms. This “parental behavior” is beyond the
scope of traditional employer-employee relationships; instead, it
can be interpreted as a manifestation of close relatedness between
these interns and CSAs.  
In general, a high level of organizational trust was observed in
our fieldwork. To a great extent, the development of
organizational trust is attributed to these altruistic behaviors
nested in the BCF and CSAs. The reasons for the emergence and
evolution of altruism are beyond the scope of this paper.
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize the existence of these
altruistic behaviors and their positive impacts on the development
of organizational trust.
DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE
TRANSFORMATION OF TRUST
With our first-hand evidence and analysis, we have shown how
different social conditions and mechanisms have contributed to
the transformation of trust (see Fig. 1). Although this paper
focuses on the specific case of the BCF, our observations on the
transformation of trust patterns are significant for a wider
understanding of China’s changing food systems in the era of
food safety crisis. We make this assertion for a number of reasons.
Fig. 1. The transformation of trust in China's alternative food
networks
First, this research is drawn from a broader, nationwide study of
the emergence of AFNs and the rapidly developing ecological
agriculture sector in China. Rather than being an isolated case,
the BCF is an example of emerging AFNs (see Schumilas 2014,
Scott et al. 2014, Si et al. 2014, Si 2015) that are fostered by
individual trust and organizational trust. In just six years, more
than 300 CSA farms emerged in China and the number is still
growing rapidly (C. W. Cheng, Food safety and social movement
[title translated from the Chinese], http://goo.gl/Xe75QI).
Farmers’ markets have also emerged in other cities across China,
including Shanghai, Tianjin, Xi’an, Guangzhou, Nanjing,
Chengdu, Chongqing, and Hangzhou. A well-established
network among, and an increasingly influential new trust
relationship within, these CSAs and farmers’ markets have
become a nontrivial force in China’s food systems. Second, the
success of the BCF and many other farmers’ markets and CSA
farms across the country demonstrate the crisis in institutional
trust that the conventional food system has relied on. In this way,
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our case study offers an effective lens through which to observe
an evolving process of transformation in trust relationships.
Third, although the BCF case is small, it symbolizes an alternative
voice to the mainstream industrial-oriented food system in China.
This “otherness” represents a new space to ask questions about,
and offers new possibilities to amend, the troubling food safety
issues in China. Although most current food safety literature
about China focuses on the governance of conventional producers
or formal regulatory institutions, this paper sheds light on critical,
yet understudied, relationships of trust in which strong, informal
institutions are partially substituting for weak, formal rules.  
Our observations regarding the transformation of trust in AFNs
have profound implications for future studies of China’s food
system and food policies. The transformation of trust
demonstrates a changing pattern of food production,
distribution, and consumption in China. This complex process
embodies not only the emergence and spread of AFNs but also
the industrialization of the food sector. The diversification of
trust in food with the enhancement of individual trust and
organizational trust in the current food system demands further
research. Moreover, new food policies must take account of these
changing dynamics in the food system. In China, the conventional
approach to coping with food safety crises has been centered on
strengthening the food safety regulatory regime (Tam and Yang
2005). Although regulation of formal regulatory institutions
yields tangible results, this conventional approach is mainly
confined to large-scale food industries.  
In this paper we highlight the transformation of trust in fast-
developing AFNs. Such “alternativeness” suggests that food
safety problems may not be resolved solely by stringent formal
regulations on industrialized food producers. Some endogenous
risks are nested in the conventional food system. As Schneider
(2014) argues, agri-industrialization might be the problem rather
than the solution to the crisis that we see in China (see also Huang
2011). Excessive use of synthetic fertilizer and chemicals
associated with agri-industrialization have not only degraded and
polluted the soil and waterways but also resulted in heavy metal
contamination and chemical residues in fresh produce, which
eventually impaired the public’s confidence in food safety (Han
2007, FORHEAD 2014, Lu et al. 2015). Intensification of the
meat industry has also led to excessive use of hormones and
antibiotics, and accelerated the spread of diseases, which has
increased food safety risk (McDonald and Iyer 2008, Li 2009,
Sharma et al. 2014). The current proindustrialization food
policies that promote the vertical integration of smallholders and
encourage capital penetration in the food sector need to
incorporate alternative ideas and models for solving the food
safety crisis. A food policy that facilitates the establishment of
not only institutional trust but also individual trust and
organizational trust will be beneficial. Potential strategies include
supporting public education about food and encouraging the
development of AFNs.  
Furthermore, this study has implications for possible policy
changes. It is important to explore ways to coordinate civil
society–initiated PGS and formal food regulatory institutions.
Second, we should explore how powerful informal institutions
facilitated by civil society should be incorporated into formal
policy-making processes. The impacts of bottom-up social
organizations on China’s food systems warrant further academic
and policy attention. Nongovernmental organizations in the West
such as food policy councils and roundtables (e.g., the Toronto
Food Policy Council; see Welsh and MacRae 1998, Marsden and
Franklin 2013) exemplify how the gap between civil society groups
and policy makers can be bridged.  
Meanwhile, it is important to note that our observations of the
transformation of trust in food are largely confined to
participants in AFNs in China. The nascent AFNs such as CSA
farms and farmers’ markets are still too marginal to transform
the mainstream food system. Although research about consumers
at these AFNs is limited, our interviews and other existing studies
show that consumers purchasing through these alternative venues
are mainly middle-class urbanites and people with special health
concerns, e.g., expectant mothers and people with cancer.
However, for some customers, the BCF is merely a trendy venue
for leisure and entertainment. Thus, more research needs to be
devoted to the analysis of people who shop at these AFNs, in
particular to the effects of social stratification on consumers’
shopping patterns. Different hierarchies within consumer groups
might shape the ways in which trust in food is encountered (Klein
2013). It is too early to extend the notion of transformation of
trust to the entire food system in China. The transformative
potential of AFNs, as many rural sociologists have discussed
(Goodman 2004, Marsden and Murdoch 2006), has yet to unfold
in China.  
This study also shows that within a system in which food
regulatory institutions are not trusted by consumers, individual
trust and organizational trust might be effective approaches to
rebuild the shattered confidence in food safety. In the case of the
BCF, the reconstruction of individual trust and the development
of organizational trust have conveniently met some urbanites’
demand for healthy food in response to food safety crises in China.
However, this does not imply that individual trust and
organizational trust have necessarily replaced institutional trust.
In fact, they coexist in many cases. For many customers, AFNs
do not replace but partially substitute for conventional food
venues. We use the term “transformation of trust” to examine the
emergence of AFNs in China rather than to suggest a
fundamental shift.  
Finally, our analysis of the transformation of trust has theoretical
implications for future social science research on issues of trust.
The problem of trust is a social dilemma; however, trust is an
indispensable element that glues a society together. This study
associates empirical evidence with social theories of trust and
proposes the concept of transformation of trust to expand the
scope of research on trust. This advancement enhances
understanding of the elusive notion of trust in more complex
social-economic-political contexts. This perspective is different
from conventional social theory research that relies on simple
socioeconomic activities or laboratory experiments with artificial
configurations.  
We acknowledge that, in empirical settings, different types of trust
are multifaceted, evolving relationships characterized by
heterogeneous social structures, institutional arrangements,
cultural contexts, and biophysical conditions. This study does not
intend to criticize the conventional approach. In fact, the
conventional approach has the merits of excluding noise and
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focusing on key variables in a controlled environment. What we
propose is methodological pluralism and contextual diversification
that seek to provide more comprehensive and nuanced
explanations. As scholars continue to be intrigued by the origins,
forms, and evolution of trust, it is also important to analyze
complex outcomes and mechanisms of trust that might vary
under different empirical conditions. We suggest that further
research should examine discoveries of new socioeconomic
phenomena; explanations for dynamics of interactions; and
factors, variables, and conditions that might sustain trust and
cooperation from a long-term perspective.
CONCLUSION
Trust is a key factor to understanding food safety issues and the
dynamics of consumer behavior in food systems. We elaborate
theories of trust in complex socioeconomic activities from a
sociological perspective and emphasize an evolving process, i.e.,
transformation of trust, that has not been adequately studied in
previous literature. We provide a case of trust in food, the Beijing
Country Fair farmers’ market, that vividly illustrates an
important yet understudied phenomenon in which informal social
mechanisms have been partially substituting for formal
institutions and gradually fostering the transformation of trust
in China’s alternative food networks. We have shown various
facets of the disruption of institutional trust and how the
explosion of information has contributed to this process. We
associated our first-hand data with theories of direct and indirect
reciprocity and explained how individual trust between customers
and vendors has been reconstructed. Finally, we uncovered two
additional social conditions, endogenous rules and altruism, and
elucidated how they have facilitated the development of
organizational trust and the prosperity of the BCF and CSAs. By
unpacking the process of trust transformation, we supplement
previous social theories of trust from a dynamic and
multidimensional perspective. We also provide new understandings
of trust relationships and socioeconomic interactions between
various stakeholders in food systems against the backdrop of the
food safety crisis in China. [1] For a more in-depth discussion on
the defining characteristics of alternative food networks in China,
see Si et al. 2014 and Schumilas 2014.
[2] Community-Supported Agriculture (CSA), as a critical type of
alternative food network, enables a consumer to pay a farmer in
advance of the growing season for a share of the harvest. The
farmer promises to farm in an ecological way and typically
delivers a share of harvest weekly to the customer during the
season. In CSAs, customers share both the risk of agriculture and
the harvest with farmers.
[3] Green food (l üse shipin) is a food quality standard in China
that is lower than the organic standard. On the differences between
green food, “hazard-free food” (wugonghai), and organic food in
China, see Scott et al. (2014).
[4] The distrust of institutions is also enhanced by the debate
centering upon the health implications and the illegal
dissemination of genetically modified (GM) food. Because GM
crops have been reported to be growing illegally in China, the
Chinese government has been widely criticized for failing to
control its spread (e.g., Jian 2014).
[5] Although there are various definitions of middle class, in this
paper, we use this term to refer to “the group of urban and rural
residents whose income level, within a standard time period and
locality, is comparable to the middle income level for all citizens”
(Wu and Yang 2006, as cited in Shi et al. 2011a:555). According
to Lu (2010), about 23% of the population (around 300 million
people) in China belonged to the middle class by the year 2010,
and that proportion is still growing. According to our interview
with one market manager in April 2012, customers of the Beijing
Country Fair (BCF) were mainly middle-class households who
“can afford Starbucks coffee. ” Studies of the customers of the
Little Donkey Farm (Shi et al. 2011a, b), which is a well-known
vendor at the BCF, also demonstrated a strong middle-class
feature, with 71% of them reporting a monthly household income
above 10,001 RMB (US$1667), whereas the average monthly
income of a middle-class family in Beijing in 2010 was 10,007
RMB (Lu 2010).
[6] In 2012, each market event generated total sales of
150,000-250,000 CNY (approximately US$25,000-$41,600; Shu
2012). Because of the overwhelming popularity and growing
number of customers, the Beijing Country Fair expanded its
single weekly market to two or three markets at different locations
in Beijing.
[7] Wechat is a mobile text and voice messaging communication
app developed by Chinese IT Company Tencent. As of August
2014, Wechat had 438 million active users.
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